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Abstract 
The paper explores the multiple identities constructions of young Muslim women of 
Egyptian origin who were born and/or grew up in Italy. Using an intersectional ap-
proach, the work analyzes three central aspects of identity reference points for children 
of migration, including the relationship with their parents’ country of origin, Egypt; the 
substantial sense of belonging (through formal and informal citizenship) to Italy; and 
the feeling of being part of a transnational Islamic umma (community) with specific Eu-
ropean features. 
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1. Introduction. An intersectional approach to study the multiple 
belongings of young Muslim women in Italy 
 
This study explores the multiple identities constructions of young Muslim women of 
Egyptian origin who were born and/or grew up in Rome1. 
Using an intersectional approach, the work analyzes three central aspects of identity   
reference points for children of migration, commonly called ‘second generation’ in 
Italy2, (Ambrosini 2004; Colombo 2010; Granata 2011), including the relationship with 
 their parents’ country of origin (Egypt), the relationship with the country where they 
were born/grew up (Italy), and religious identification (Islam).  
The analysis of the identities of young Muslim women presented here places the 
religious dimension in relationship to a variety of other aspects that make up their 
identities.  
First of all, this study keeps in consideration that gender, biological sex, and sexual 
orientation are decisive factors in differentiating the ways in which religion is 
experienced. Socialization based on the principles of Islam, how it is transmitted, and 
how it is practiced privately and publicly differs for girls and boys.  
Secondly, we see the inherited/experienced/reinvented/rejected religious dimension as 
an aspect making up the individual biographies that can only be understood if placed 
within evolving processes.  
                                                        
1 This paper is based on the results of a research funded by the “Forum per i Problemi della Pace e della 
Guerra” and coordinated by the University of Florence. It is part of a broader and comparative project on 
“second generation” young Muslim women in Italy and gender citizenship.  The analysis of the first part 
of this research project based on interviews with young women of bengali and moroccan origins was 
published in the following essay: Pepicelli, R. (2015), “Dall’Islam delle madri all’Islam delle figlie. 
Giovani musulmane tra agency e intersezionalità nella città di Roma”, in Acocella I. e Pepicelli R. (a cura 
di), Giovani musulmane in Italia. Percorsi biografici e pratiche quotidiane, Bologna, Il Mulino, pp. 61–
94. 
2 In Italy, opinion is not unanimous on the terminology to refer to the young children of migrant parents. 
”Second generation” is the expression most commonly used, also by some young people for self-
representation in public debate. Consider, for example, the network “G2-Seconde Generazioni”. Howev-
er, this term does not seem to fully reflect the complexity of the phenomenon, as it risks emphasizing the 
migratory experience as an indelible feature of the biographies, without considering that some youth were 
born in Italy and, therefore, never emigrated from any country. Here, preference has been given to the ex-
pression “sons and daughters of migrations” to indicate, on the one hand, the migratory experience their 
parents underwent and transmitted and, on the other, to underline how the migration process is in constant 
flux and has not necessarily been concluded, being able to produce new migrations and movements to-
wards other parts of the world in the future. 
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The relationship with religion is not a condition given once and for all in a single 
way. Youth, as also older people, move through plural routes that are not one-
directional, but are Islamized, de-Islamized, and re-Islamized (Khosrokhavar 1997) in 
relationship to aspects of their individual biographies (meetings, inclusions, exclusions, 
traumas, joys, etc.) and external events at the community level, not directly connected to 
them, but that lead them to question dimensions of their identities3.  
In Italy, and the rest of Europe, given the re-Islamization of discourses, practices and 
public and private spaces, young women—and young men—who were born and/or 
raised in Muslim families emigrated to Italy, interact in a plural way (Barbagli e 
Schmoll 2011; Pacini 2005; Ricucci 2014; Saint-Blancat 2004); while there is a 
growing number of young women who react to this with active involvement, there are 
also those who react with conflictual reactions, in which the religious factor is 
marginalized, if not excluded, and original syncretisms are enacted to create hybrid 
forms.  
Positions and identities should not be considered fixed, but rather placed within 
dynamic, constantly evolving relationships that remove individuals from the 
reductionism of monolithic categories, which would set individuals in fixed identities, 
blind to the individualities and subjectivities of their experiences (Perilli and Ellena 
2012).  
From this perspective, the theory of intersectionality (Crenshaw 1989; Marchetti 
2013) is very useful, as this analytical approach sheds light on the multiple, 
simultaneous nature of systems of domination, and the interdependence of the different 
categories of identity in individuals’ multi-positionality.  
The paper is based on observant participation and ten in-depth interviews with young 
women of Egyptian origin of Muslim religion between 16 and 24 years old4.  
All with Italian citizenship, they were born in Italy or came when they were very young. 
These young women come from different neighborhoods in Rome and are lower middle 
class. They are daughters of parents with similar migration stories, with the father 
                                                        
3 Consider the effects of the September 11 attacks on the identity construction of many Muslims, who 
were pushed to express loyalty to only one of their identities, either the Muslim one or the Western one. 
4 The interviews were conducted between June and October 2015. The young women are identified with 
pseudonyms. 
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coming to Italy earlier followed by the mother later. They are mid-sized families with 
two or three children, most of whose mothers are housewives, and whose fathers work 
mainly in food service and retail.  
The interviewees are secondary school students—mainly enrolled in Italian lyceum sec-
ondary schools with a focus on languages, science or art—and universities, studying po-
litical science, law, engineering, pharmaceutical, and languages, with a single case of an 
unemployed twenty-three-year-old woman. All consider themselves practicing Mus-
lims, though to different degrees and with different nuances. Many participate or have 
participated in youth associations with a religious orientation. 
 
2. The Egyptian community in Italy: statistics, qualities and 
trajectories 
 
The community factor is not a neutral factor in shaping identity definitions of children 
of migrations. As such, it is worth briefly considering a few aspects of the Egyptian 
community in Italy5.  
The Egyptian community in Italy is currently the eighth largest community of non-
EU citizens legally residing in Italy; on January 1, 2014, immigrants of Egyptian origin 
counted 135,284, accounting for 3.5% of the total of non-EU citizens in Italy. Their 
presence has gradually increased in recent years, going from 2.7% in 2008 to 3.5% in 
2013. One of the primary traits of this community is the clear prevalence of men, who 
number 95,000, accounting for 70.5% of the total; there are approximately 40,000 
women for the remaining 29.5%. This large gender imbalance seems to be a testament 
to a lack of job security and economic stability, factors that make it possible to start the 
family reunification process. 
With regard to geographical distribution, more than four out of five Egyptian citizens 
live in North Italy (81% of the total), predominantly in the region of Lombardy (67.8% 
of the total). Lombardy is followed by the following regions, in order of Egyptian popu-
                                                        
5 The source for the data in this paragraph is from the report “La Comunità Egiziana in Italia – 2013”; 
http://www.integrazionemigranti.gov.it/Attualita/IlPunto/Documents/rapporti_comunita_2014/rapporti%2
0integrali/ComunitaEgiziana.pdf 
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lation: Lazio (14.1%), Emilia Romagna (5.7%) and Piedmont (4.1%), with a concentra-
tion in large metropolitan areas (such as Milan and Rome).  
In terms of employment, 57.8% of Egyptian workers are employed in the tertiary 
sector. A particular specialization of the Egyptian community emerges in jobs related to 
the “hotel and restaurant” industry, which employs 28.2% of Egyptian workers. The in-
dustrial sector employs 40.8% of workers from this community. The construction indus-
try employs 23.3% of Egyptian workers, and 12.5% in heavy industry. It is an important 
point that Egyptian workers mostly have medium-high education levels; 56.2% of 
community members have a second-level high school education (36.6%) or university 
education (19.5%). It is noteworthy that participation in the labor market primarily re-
gards the male members of the community. There is an unemployment level of about 
9% among women, and an inactivity level of around 85%.  
Egyptian immigration in Italy is predominantly male and generally young; 50.1% of 
Egyptians citizens legally residing in Italy are under 30 years old, with a high propor-
tion of minors within the community, accounting for 31.7% of the total. 
If we look more in depth at the child and youth population, with particular focus on 
the gender component—a focus of this study—we note that there is a more balanced 
gender ratio among children, with 23,760 males and 19,088 females, with the female 
percentage rising to 44.5% (compared to the above-mentioned 29% among Egyptian 
citizens as a whole).  
Considering the rates and forms of education, there were 15,239 students of Egyptian 
origin in the Italian school system in the school year 2013/2014, accounting for 2.5% of 
the non-EU school community. In 2013 there were 659 Egyptian students enrolled in 
university, accounting for 1.2% of the total of non-EU university students. The percent-
age of women within the Egyptian school population is higher at lower levels (46% 
both in nursery school and elementary school). At higher academic levels, their percent-
age gradually decreases (42% in first-level secondary school and 33% in second-level 
secondary school). The gender distribution of students from the Egyptian community 
enrolled in the different sections of second-level secondary school has a strong preva-
lence of women in the fields of training colleges. For the male segment of the Egyptian 
community, we see an accentuated preference for technical/trade education. The phe-
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nomenon of young people who do not work, do not study, and are not in training, 
termed NEETs (Not in Employment, Education and Training), has long been the focus 
of discussion about young generations in Europe, not excluding young foreigners, or 
children of foreigners in Italy. There are 7,709 young people between 15 and 29 years 
old in the Egyptian community who do not study and do not work, accounting for 2.8% 
of NEETs of non-EU origin.  
The economic crisis that exploded in 2008 has dramatically worsened the perception 
of foreigners and their descendants in Italy, as well as the living conditions of many for-
eign families and many young people. Statistics show that, between 2008 and 2013, the 
unemployment rate for the Egyptian community increased by over 11 percentage points, 
from 10.3% to 21.9%6. In recent years, many of the fathers of the young women inter-
viewed, and some of the few mothers who work (as mentioned, women in the commu-
nity are mainly housewives and do not work outside of the home) found themselves un-
employed, having to close businesses, and experiencing exclusion from the job market 
and job insecurity.  
 
My father has been here for 35 years. After you lose your job, you feel left out in 
the cold. You think, ‘I left my country to give my family a future and this future is 
not certain, whether or not you’ll manage to recover […].You feel the recession 
more when you’re a foreigner or an Italian with a foreign name, because you hear 
people saying, ‘Let’s give Italians work first and then the others. Why should they 
steal our jobs?’ And then you think, I’ve worked alongside you for 35 years, and 
I’ve always paid taxes and contributions just like you (Fatima, 21). 
 
Given the economic difficulties faced by their families, some of the young women 
interviewed, though deeply rooted in Italy, were considering the idea of migrating in the 
near future. Though they are generally looking more towards other European countries, 
                                                        
6 During the same period of time, the unemployment rate of Italians rose from 6.6% to 11.5%, and that of 
the non-EU community as a whole from 8.8% to 18%. In light of this evidence, we can say that the Egyp-
tian community was significantly affected in terms of employment by the economic crisis, especially re-
garding the increase in absolute and percentage terms of the number of unemployed. See the above-
mentioned report “La Comunità Egiziana in Italia — 2013”. 
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there are some thinking that Egypt may give them employment opportunities, especially 
those who grew up abroad, and have foreign school diplomas and university degrees.  
 
I always thought that I would never leave Rome, which is my city, but now I think 
that there isn’t much future here. I also think that about the rest of Europe. There is 
no certainty anywhere. I think maybe I would like to go back to my country. I had 
never considered it an opportunity, but, actually, why not? It is changing now and 
it’s sure to improve over time. I can see now the situation in which the country is. 
Italy is declining, and you start to look around and see where to go (Fatima, 21).  
 
Now I don’t know whether to do a degree course in cooperation and development 
at the university here, or to move to Egypt and study Arabic7, see if I can find a job 
there. I dream of teaching Italian at the Italian Embassy to children of Italians who 
live there (Saida, 24).  
 
2.1 Roots and multiple identity belongings: the Arab umma, the Egyptian nation, the 
Italian citizenship 
The young women of Egyptian origin interviewed described a very strong identity con-
nection to their parents’ country of origin. This can be likely related to the history of 
Egyptian nationalism. Since before independence, and all the more afterwards, the 
Egyptian people have tended towards strong national and pan-Arab pride.8  
The hopes fueled by the January 25, 2011 revolution revived a number of identity 
and nationalism processes, including among young people in the diaspora, at least for 
the first years after the fall of Mubarak.9 In the wake of protests, which were the focus 
of major media attention worldwide, young people born and/or raised abroad started to 
                                                        
7 Though many of the young women interviewed speak Egyptian, they have difficulty reading and writ-
ing in Arabic. Though in some families, the children studied classical Arabic (mostly through courses or-
ganized at the mosque on weekends), and some have even followed the study program of Egyptian 
schools since middle school, taking an exam every year to be able to obtain Egyptian school diplomas, 
parallel to the Italian ones, many of the young women are only able to speak the Egyptian dialect. 
8 On Arab nationalism and Egyptian nationalism in particular see Tibi B. (1996), Arab Nationalism. 
Between Islam and the Nation-State, Palgrave, Hampshire. 
9 For a reconstruction of the revolution in Egypt, see Gervasio G., Teti A. (2013), I Fratelli musulmani e 
la rivoluzione di gennaio: fra tentazione egemonica e neoautoritarismo in Campanini M., Le rivolte ara-
be e l’Islam. La transizione incompiuta, Bologna, Il Mulino. 
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give more attention to the situation and their parents’ country and identify with it and its 
hopes and disappointments. 
 
After the 2011 revolution, I paid more attention to everything. I felt closer to Egypt 
and I felt the importance of a motherland. I was pretty young and I didn’t under-
stand, but that gradually changed (Omaima, 16 years). 
 
Before the revolution, I didn’t follow it much, and after the revolution more so, be-
cause I believed in it at first. I thought that maybe your vote could count, because, 
before, you went to vote, but it didn’t matter. The same person always won for 30 
years! A lot of people believed in it, but then there was a coup, and everything 
went back to how it was before, or maybe worse (Khadija, 24).  
 
I followed political life in Egypt. I followed it from the time of the revolution until 
the end, and I still do […] At the beginning, I believed in the revolution, but after 
that, after what happened […] During the elections, I went to the mosques [in Ita-
ly], I asked people if they wanted help to register to vote with my computer. And I 
went around like that, to improve the country. Because the situation in the country 
isn’t good, mainly because of ignorance, the fact of not voting. So I wanted to help 
from that perspective. I did it just because it was a matter of justice (Salwa, 23). 
 
The revolution brought Egypt closer to the children of migration. For some of the in-
terviewees, this attention translated into direct political engagement both in Egypt and 
in Italy. Being young and female is not considered an obstacle to participating in 
demonstrations, sit-ins (even when considered dangerous for their physical safety) to 
express their perspective and support for one side over the other, both during the earliest 
phase of the revolution, and during the so-called years of transition. Through news, TV 
programs, blogs, online platforms, Facebook conversations, Skype with friends and rel-
atives, they started to pay more attention to the politics of their parents’ country, vari-
ously taking the side of one faction or the other. Mostly the military coup on July 3, 
2013 and the repression of members of the Brotherhood and different kinds of political 
oppositions polarized the positions.  
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The young women interviewed are divided in their opinions about post-revolutionary 
developments. If some were in favor of Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi, former head of Egypt's 
armed forces, supported by some “secular” parts of the population, serving an anti-
Islamist function, believing that the country’s economic development and freedom from 
political instability can only be achieved by a strong political figure such as a military; 
others were in favor of Morsi, leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, who won the presi-
dential elections of 2012, and was deposed by a military coup on July 3, 201310. Those 
particularly supported the Broterhood after the repression on August 14, 2013 of sup-
porters of the Muslim Brotherhood who gathered in Rabi’a al-’Adawiyya Square in Cai-
ro11. To express openly their political convictions some participated in the demonstra-
tions that were organized in support of the Muslim Brotherhood in 2013 and 2014 in 
Cairo, Milan and in Rome. 
 
I am not with Morsi, with the Muslim Brotherhood. I think they are religious fakes. 
It is all just a cover. I think they are ruining the country. And maybe the people 
who support them are naïve, pious people. At the beginning, when they took Mu-
barak down, I would have voted for Morsi too, because he was the best alternative. 
I would say that a man of religion understands well what wrong is, he won’t hurt 
us, he’ll know how to lead the country, but that’s not what happened. He wasn’t 
wrong personally, it was just that he was a puppet. They controlled him from 
above. Egypt was no longer safe, including from what happened on January 25 
when they opened all the prisons and everyone went out in the streets. There was 
no more safety […] Al-Sisi is surely more in favor of helping the country. […] 
Let’s say that I can’t imagine al-Sisi as a dictator. He didn’t even want to run. It 
was the people that insisted that he go into it, the people asked him to (Maryam, 
19). 
 
                                                        
10 For a reconstruction of the coup in Egypt and the arc of the Muslim Brotherhood from the election vic-
tory in 2012 to its recent repression, see Daniela Pioppi, Il raccolto amaro. I Fratelli musulmani in Egitto 
e il fallimento della via moderata al potere, in Laura Guazzone (edited by), Storia e evoluzione dei movi-
menti islamisti arabi. I Fratelli musulmani e gli altri, Mondadori, Milan, 2015. 
11 Amnesty International’s 2014–2015 annual report estimates that 1,400 people were killed and 40,000 
were arrested in Egypt between July 2013 and the end of 2014, and reports in that period an extensive use 
of torture and the drastic reduction of individual freedoms and protections  (Amnesty International 2015, 
137–139). 
 213 
I was in Egypt during the attacks in Rabi’a Square. On August 14, I wasn’t in the 
square, but at 7:30 am I got a call from my aunt who said, “They are attacking Ra-
bi’a al-’Adawiya Square” My mother woke me up and went, “They are attacking 
Rabi’a al-’Adawiya Square” I turned on the TV, Al Jazeera, of course, and you saw 
all those horrific scenes. My mother is chicken. But on that day I said to her, “Ma-
ma, we have to help them. We have to save them” […]  We went out, and we went 
to the pharmacy to look for masks […] There was a long march that closed the 
street. We joined it, and I found some friends there. […] Then the Friday after that, 
it was the day of Ramses Square, we were supposed to all go to Ramses Square. It 
was really horrible. […] My father is against Morsi, against the Muslim brother-
hood. My father is on the other side completely. My parents are separated. When I 
go to a papa’s, we always fight. For a while we couldn’t even look at each other. 
The day of Rabi’a, I was crying and I said “Papa, did you see it?” “So what did I 
see? These Muslim brothers killing” “Papa, what are you saying? I was there too” 
“And you’re one of them, how can I believe you?” (Salwa, 23).  
 
Though all the young women interviewed said that they were happy for the change 
that came with the fall of Mubarak, because it opened up new spaces for freedom and –
– at least in the beginning – created hope and the possibility of economic development 
in Egypt, they ended up taking different political sides. It is important to stress here that 
though all of the young women interviewed describe themselves as religious and prac-
ticing, and express conservative values in social and political terms, they are certainly 
not all in favor of Islamist ideology. Indeed, this is an example how the religious revival 
– on the rise since the 1990s and gaining ground in first decade of the 21st century – 
and Islamism12 do not necessarily coincide and overlap. For many, deciding to place re-
ligion at the center of their private and public lives does not necessarily mean agreeing 
with Islamist political ideology. We should pay particular attention to this aspect in ap-
proaching an analysis of Islam’s spread in Europe, as well as in the Muslim world.  
The identity connection to Egypt, although a strong part of all the narratives, does 
not become the only predominant element of identity. A strong sense of belonging to 
                                                        
12 For an analysis of Islamism and the so-called “political Islam”, see Laura Guazzone (edited by), Storia 
e evoluzione dei movimenti islamisti arabi. I Fratelli musulmani e gli altri, Mondadori, Milan, 2015, par-
ticularly the introduction. 
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Italy also recurs in all of the interviews. The complex relationship dynamics with the 
country that their parents’ origin and the country where they grew up can be better un-
derstood by drawing on the concept of transnationalism, which is the process through 
which immigrants and their descendants build social fields that connect the country of 
origin and the country of settlement. The concept of transnationalism shows us how a 
series of social phenomena cannot be fully understood using the single nation state as 
the field of study. Specifically, migratory movements cannot be understood as the sim-
ple, well-defined movement of individuals from one, essentially independent and cir-
cumscribed, system (a state) to another with the same characteristics. From a transna-
tional perspective, immigrants and their descendants can simultaneously participate in 
more than one national context (Caselli 2009: 57); the interview excerpts quoted here 
are clear evidence of this fact. The interviews outline a duality of national identifica-
tions, with a general problem finding single-sided definitions.  
 
I do not feel 100% Egyptian, because when I go there, I do not feel like I’m in the 
right place. They see a lot of behaviors as strange, and they call you the one from 
Italy. I definitely can’t imagine living there. Though I say that Egypt is my country, 
and there is that part, but it isn’t 100%. And that goes for Italy too. I do not feel 
100% Italian, even though I would never leave this country, because the habits and 
culture are now part of you, your identity, and it’s the bigger part, I don’t know if 
it’s the stronger one. And I mean, if I go to Egypt, I cannot have a whole conversa-
tion in Arabic, I have to slip in something in Italian. I can’t help myself. It’s be-
come part of my character, including the ways of doing things and thinking (Kha-
dija, 24).  
 
I came here when I was one, so I consider myself Italian […] My father has been 
here for 35 years. My mother for 25 years. They should consider themselves Italian 
too. We only go to Egypt for vacation. Until the revolution, we went every year, 
but we hadn’t been for five years, and then we went back this summer. Even 
though I was not born or raised in my country, maybe my second country. I am not 
only Italian, or only Egyptian, and I’m not half-and-half either. Maybe more Ital-
ian. I am always a foreigner there, at least in the eyes of others (Fatima, 21). 
 215 
I consider myself more Egyptian, even though then I’d have no identity. […] At 
home we speak Egyptian a bit more, but there are a lot of other things, some pieces 
of furniture, I can’t say them in Italian, my parents only use the Egyptian terms. 
And then I still can’t take on the Italian culture. My world is more Arab. […] Even 
though I’m Italian for all purposes, the way people look at me makes me feel for-
eign […] And then Egyptians consider you someone who lives outside. You are 
where you are, they never consider you from that country (Maryam, 19). 
 
The identity constructions of young Muslim women of Egyptian origin born and 
raised in Italy starts from different points of reference, including the home country of 
their parents (Egypt), the substantial sense of belonging (through formal and informal 
citizenship) to Italy and Europe, and, last but not least, the concept of belonging to a 
transnational Islamic umma (community) with specific European features.  
 
I am an Italian of Arab origin who hates the Arab tradition, but loves her religion. 
When I am there, I can see clearly that religion is mixed with tradition, misinfor-
mation, and habits dictated as religious dogma even though they aren’t. I am Mus-
lim. But Italian. I am a regular Italian girl with her own religious life (Saida, 24). 
 
2.2 Being Italian and Muslim  
As already said, the young women interviewed all described themselves as practicing 
Muslims and gave the religious dimension a central role in their lives, though with dif-
ferent nuances. Only a minority considered Islam something to be relegated to their pri-
vate lives. 
 
My faith is at home. I’ve always thought if there are questions, I answer and ex-
plain, but I shouldn’t impose anything on anyone. There has to be respect, you are 
in a different society. You can’t always put religion at the center of things. Faith is 
something between you and God (Fatima, 21). 
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The majority of the young women in this study consider Islam a part of their lives to 
be lived and applied to their public life as well. In their words, Islam is din wa dunya 
(religion and world), something that influences many parts of their daily lives. 
 
Islam is the center of everything. It is a religion and a lifestyle […] it teaches you 
how to live, it teaches you everything, even how to enter the bathroom. It tells you 
what is wrong. Maybe some people see the rules as too strict. But if they aren’t 
strict and there aren’t rules, people do whatever they want (Omaima, 16).  
 
The importance of the religion in shaping choices and behaviors is also shown by the 
fact that almost all of the youth interviewed agree that they could never marry a non-
Muslim person, because they feel that living in accord with Islamic principles and hav-
ing someone by their side helps them to practice daily, strengthens the path of faith tak-
en and would help raise children according to Muslim ethics. Nationality was not im-
portant for these young women, though some of them say they would prefer to marry a 
person who shares the experience of being the children of migrants in Italy.  
 
Being religious, I want somebody who would accompany me on my path and not 
hinder me (Alima, 23). 
 
I can’t marry a non-Muslim and find pork or beer in the refrigerator; someone who 
doesn’t respect it while I’m fasting or praying. There are a lot of things that other 
person can’t understand if they don’t believe. Psychologically speaking, for a 
peaceful, happy family, it is better this way (Salwa, 24). 
 
I want somebody with whom I feel safe, and is a good person, in Islamic terms as 
well, and has understood the religion. Because if one day the love should end, 
which it seems happens, I will be sure that they’ll never be a lack of respect be-
cause in our religion the spouses have to have the fear of God, and out of fear of 
God, even if he doesn’t love me anymore, he will continue to respect me. This is 
why it is very important that he understand the religion (Khadija, 24). 
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This central role attributed to the religious dimension does not seem to contradict 
them considering themselves Italian and European. In fact, the interviewees saw living 
in the West as a chance to let them follow the true Islamic message, “freed” from the in-
fluence of the layers of traditions of the countries in which Islam been taken root 
throughout the centuries, along the geographic routes of Islamic expansion. On social 
issues (mu’amalat), Islam adapted to the different local traditions of the countries where 
it took root. For example, Muslims of Africa and Asia have maintained many of their 
pre-Islamic lifestyles and customs, though respecting the practices and rules shared by 
all Muslims. This is the basis of the major differences in customs between Arab, Afri-
can, Turkish and Asian Muslims, and in the specific features of the emerging European 
Islam (Ramadan 2008; Ferrari 2008; Allievi 2005, Maniscalco 2012; Pace 2004). In the 
eyes of many faithful, Islam in Europe seems an opportunity to live Islam adhering to 
the original principles of the faith, far from habitual customs and traditions. In Europe, 
where Islam is a minority religion, and often with the majority of the population against 
it, religious practice for many young people becomes a conscious choice rather than the 
product of the repetition of practices become habitual that no longer question the deeper 
meaning of the belief and behaviors. 
 
I think that if I were in Egypt I would not be so practicing. Maybe I would wear the 
veil because everyone does, I would pray because in Egypt families are larger, ex-
tended, and you see everyone who does it. In Italy our parents are more concerned 
with explaining the meaning of things because you will grow up in a society that is 
not Muslim, and so if they do not explain things to you, you will become someone 
else. You care more about your faith in a country that is not Muslim. And then, I 
don’t know because I’ve never lived in Egypt, but honestly I think that here, de-
spite all the problems, you can live your religious faith more freely. Here if I want 
to wear a veil, aside from the comments people make, the Constitution guarantees 
me the right to do so. If I want to go to mosque, be part of an association, I can live 
my faith as I want to, whereas in Arab countries, it is definitely not like that. If 
someone wants to have a beard, he is immediately classified as a Muslim Brother, 
but what does that mean? Now beards are in fashion, even people have them who 
don’t care anything about it all. My brother has one because he likes it, and he 
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says, “If I have to go, do I have to shave it? I don’t want to” I can’t stand the fact 
that if someone is practicing and wants to do all the prayers in a mosque, in Egypt 
people might say “OK, who knows who that guy is? What’s he doing?” And they 
start to stare at him. It’s not true that there’s all this freedom. It’s better here (Kha-
dija, 24). 
 
I consider myself lucky to have been born here. If I had been born in an Arab coun-
try, it would have been different. When you see everyone doing things, you do 
them too, even if they are wrong. Here you do things because you have really un-
derstood them, so that’s better. Even though some people are afraid, and they say 
how can we raise our children well, we’d better go back to our countries. But I 
think that’s a wrong way of thinking (Samia, 23). 
 
I’m more relaxed here, where there are not people around mixing religion and tra-
dition. When I meet someone who is unclear about some concepts, I explain them 
to them. It’s different when I’m talking to a Muslim who overlaps traditions and re-
ligion, then it becomes a lot more complicated (Saida, 24). 
 
In Egypt women wear the veil because everyone does it, and not because they real-
ly believe in it, and it’s like that in all Arab countries. And then now there is a lot 
of attraction to America, Europe, fashion. I go to Egypt and I see a bunch of things 
have changed. Being here, you try to preserve your traditions, and you protect 
them; there, habits change and the people follow the crowd. A lot of things have 
changed. I can see it talking to my cousin, for example. If they see how we live, 
they say that we are more practicing than they are (Leila, 16). 
 
I really think that in the West we really feel it [Islam] I was sure that I would wear 
the veil sooner or later. You could say that in Arab countries it’s become more 
something of tradition than of belief. When you get to a certain age, you start wear-
ing it. And then a lot of people use it as a tactic, because maybe they think it looks 
good on them. I know a bunch of Egyptian girls who wear it just because they 
don’t have nice hair (Maryam, 19). 
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For a lot of young people who grew up in Europe, Islam is no longer associated with 
the Muslim-majority countries that their parents come from. Now it’s a transnational re-
ligion that finds its own meaning and opportunity to strengthen itself in the adverse set-
ting of diasporas.  
 
And that’s how my love for Islam grew, when it started being attacked (Salwa, 23). 
 
From this perspective, Islam does not appear linked to local traditions, but projected 
in a “deterritorialized”, “globalized” (Roy 2002), “neo-community” dimension 
(Khosrokhavar 2002; Saint-Blanc 2002), that can easily joining with individual reli-
gious seeking that transcends the boundaries of states and family bonds. Many of the 
young women tell that they were shaped by more than their family teachings, though 
they are the foundation of their religious background, and that they moved in independ-
ent directions. 
 
We are much more aware. My parents were not practicing. My mother tried to be 
practicing, but my father did not. And they know a lot less about religion than we 
do. They learned while we were learning (Salwa, 23).  
 
Though the parents are generally the first to hand down a religious identity, and in 
some cases they continue to be the primary figures, as the children grow up, they are in-
creasingly being shaped by their individual readings, websites, blogs, forums, chat, TV 
programs13, and Islamic centers14. The young women interviewed identified scholars as 
their religious authorities – many of whom are Egyptian, but not necessarily so – known 
worldwide through the media of television screens and computers, such as telepreachers 
(or televangelists) like Amr Khaled, Mustafa Hosny15, Omar Abdelkafy or the famous 
                                                        
13 On the phenomenon of the influence of Arab television channels on religious education, see Renata 
Pepicelli (2014b) . 
14 In Rome, the Islamic center al-Huda in the Centocelle neighborhood is particularly active. On Satur-
days and Sundays, using the spaces of the public school close to the mosque of the same name, it gives 
hundreds of boys and girls, mainly children of Arab speaking families, though not exclusively, Arabi-
zation and religious education courses. 
15 Born in 1978, Hosny is very popular among young Muslims, particularly for his young age and ability 
to address religious questions from a perspective aware of youth issues. 
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Egyptian shaikh al-Qaradawi and the shuyukh of pan Arab religious television broad-
casts such as Iqraa. At some of the most knowledgeable and forward-thinking, there are 
also certain European Islam intellectuals who are authorities in religious matters, such 
as Tariq Ramadan, and are trying to define the characteristics of European Islam (Ram-
adan 2008).  
 
For lessons, I like certain young people on TV, like Moustafa Hosny, a very young 
Egyptian, who has a way of talking that attracts young people. I also listen to Amr 
Khaled, though now a lot of people criticized him for his political positions, but he 
hasn’t done anything for a while […] You know how many young girls come to 
ask us advice? And to give an answer, I go and look or I ask. I know a person who 
comes to mosque and has studied sharia and she sends you the source, so you are 
sure. I ask her a lot of things. Or there’s an imam that I like who is in Brescia, 
Amin el Hazmi. In Italy we all know each other, because with G.M.I.16 we end up 
traveling around, going to training courses, and I like some of his conferences […] 
It’s funny, but I’ve never been to a conference by Tariq Ramadan, who was in 
Rome recently and I wanted to go. I read some of his things, and he seems pretty 
good. Anyhow, he’s for an European Islam […] He talks about these issues, immi-
gration, how to live as a Muslim in a Western country […] Or I follow people like 
Omar Abdelkafy, who even came to Italy, but this man and Qaradawi are a lot old-
er, and I know he’s now on the European Council, so the things that he says apply 
to European countries too, it even though a lot of people don’t like him (Khadija, 
24). 
 
Their relationship with these authorities, who are mainly men, is not one of blind 
obedience, but is rather dynamic and plural. They are dynamic in that the discussions 
and practices presented are not accepted without question, but are put to the test of rea-
son and the contemporary age. They are plural in that it young men and women drawn 
on many sources and writers, while also returning to the sacred texts individually or in 
groups. Dialogue with peers, whether in informal settings or structured situations, is 
considered an important way to educate themselves in religion.  
                                                        
16 For a discussion of the activities of the G.M.I. association (Giovani musulmani in Italia), see below. 
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If there something I don’t understand, I ask my mother first. And then maybe if 
there’s a word in Arabic that I don’t understand, I have to ask someone who has 
Arabic and Italian like me. I ask my friend S. or my mother, who is wise. Some-
times I’m dense, and some things I don’t understand, when she is desperate, S. 
sends me some books, or something (Maryam, 19). 
 
On the path of this religious seeking, some young men and women who choose to 
reposition Islam at the core of their lives, turn towards youth associations based on 
Muslim values17. In Rome, the most active of these groups are Giovani musulmani 
d’Italia (G.M.I.) and Islamic Relief. G.M.I., founded in 2001, focuses on promoting 
Muslim youth culture into harmony with an Italian identity and requires recognition for 
Muslims as part of the nation18; Islamic Relief  has gained ground in recent years and is 
an international organization, informed by Islamic ethics, focused on fundraising for 
emergencies and development projects in countries struck by natural disasters or con-
flicts (Bellion-Jourdan 2004). Whereas G.M.I. is focused on Italy, with the intention to 
bring out a dual identity, as Italo-Muslim, in which the national dimension does not ob-
scure or force into private life the Muslim identity (Khosrokhavar 2002, 166-169); Is-
lamic Relief  has a transnational orientation, talking about the umma, the community of 
believers as a whole, beyond national boundaries. Participation in these kinds of associ-
ations ensures that Islam becomes a factor of integration, as it facilitates the process of 
young people’s social integration (Khosrokhavar 2002, 166). Many of the young wom-
en of Egyptian origin talk about having had contact with G.M.I. and Islamic Relief at 
various levels, from leadership positions to having just participated in some meetings or 
initiatives.  
                                                        
17 It is worth noting here that, according to the most recent map of foreign associations in Italy, the 
Egyptian community is 14th by number of associations; there are 21 associations for this community, 1% 
of the total. The main activities of Egyptian associations include representing members of the second 
generation, teaching Italian and the language of origin, orientation. See the above-mentioned report “La 
Comunità Egiziana in Italia – 2013”. 
18 We read on the association’s website www.giovanimusulmani.it “G.M.I.’s activities aim to include 
young Muslims within the society through a process of ‘identity balancing’ tied to the fact that young 
Muslims in Italy, often of immigrant backgrounds, straddle two cultures, two languages and two worlds  
[…] . G.M.I. supports young Muslims in developing their Muslim and Italian identity in which their faith 
in belonging to Italy are joined and do not contradict each other” Founded in 2001, G.M.I. is considered 
close to the UCOII (Union of Islamic community organizations in Italy). For an analysis of G.M.I.’s ac-
tivities, see Annalisa Frisina  (2007) .  
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Since I was little, I have been going to mosque and to G.M.I.. We meet every Sat-
urday afternoon in an Italian middle school […] G.M.I. has the goal of bringing us 
together, getting to know our peers. We take trips, and every year we have a con-
ference, and for four days we go to a place, and the whole G.M.I. of Italy meets, 
and we focus on different themes, such as happiness, smiling […] We play games 
and have cooking competitions, drawing competitions. It is not just for talking. We 
also do workshops where you can talk with others or suggest a theme to the repre-
sentatives. Then we do a camp, divided in areas by north and south, also for four 
days during Easter vacation (Leila, 16).  
 
For G.M.I. we meet every Saturday and talk about a topic. It depends on what we 
prepare. We’ve done it by themes. The first month, it was love in all its facets, the 
love for a person, for your parents, for God, for creation. The second month it was 
science and the Arab world […] Those of us who are older prepare a lesson or 
someone who is always been passionate about something, and so knows more 
about it than we do, or someone older. For example, one of our fathers always 
comes to do the lesson (Maryam, 19). 
 
I also do volunteer work with Islamic Relief. They help during humanitarian emer-
gencies, such as in Syria and Nepal, and when there was the earthquake, Gaza. We 
do fundraising, event organization. For Ramadan, we have the Ramadan campaign, 
and I really like it. Two years ago we had the first meeting with them. They ex-
plained their goals and a bunch of young people were interested. And there’s a 
group in Rome but is not that big, but we do events […] I also went to a training 
course in London organized by Islamic Relief (Khadija, 24).  
 
I do volunteer work with the young people, with G.M.I., with Islamic Relief, and 
then I’m active in a political thing, the Freedom and Democracy Committee for 
Egypt. I always like doing volunteer work, because we’ve always had the thing 
about helping others. I love to be active, to build. I don’t like just sitting at home 
studying, because I don’t really get anything done that way. I want to be sure that 
I’m doing something good for society. This is the only thing that makes me a bit 
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stronger in Islam. Because I know that Islam loves those who do these things. This 
also makes me more attached to the religion (Salwa, 23).  
The appeal of associations like G.M.I. and Islamic Relief for young people, including 
young women who are not particularly practicing, can be explained by their offering a 
place for meeting and socialization that goes beyond the dualism of national specifics – 
country of origin, country in which one was born/raised –. The offering is supranational 
identification putting them in contact with an aspect of their identity, Islam as a reli-
gious, cultural, and social dimension that is not always easy to share and socialize in the 
mixed environments of schools and neighborhoods where they grew up. In the young 
people’s different biographies, we see a recurring need to find people with similar expe-
riences in terms of being children of migration and Muslims.  
 
My best friends are Egyptian or Arab like me. They understand me better, because 
of religion, language, experiences. The idea that they are Italian, but feel Egyptian. 
Some of them were born there and came here when they were very young (Leila, 
16). 
 
I have groups of Italian and Egyptian friends. The problem is mixing them, because 
things don’t fit together. But I like being with both groups. I have Buddhist friends, 
one is an atheist. One is Catholic, and I go with her to church when she is upset and 
needs to pray. And she comes with me to the mosque (Saida, 24). 
 
In the words of the young women interviewed there is a recurring theme of having 
different groups of friends, that of school/university friends, mainly made up of native 
Italians and children of non-Muslim immigrants, and a group of Muslim friends, whom 
they met in these religiously-based associations. These two worlds are not always easy 
to keep together, and they often recount worlds that stay mainly separate, except from 
fleeting encounters.  
 
You could say that I change my group of friends every so many years. I used to 
have a completely different group of friends. I was far from the Muslim Arab 
world. I was involved in the world of my classmates, other earlier friendships. I 
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didn’t know anyone like me. Then three years ago I met some girls who all had re-
lationships in my Arab community, and it was good for me because I was starting 
to lose myself. They cleared up some doubts for me, showing me the importance of 
a woman, how to behave, how to value myself […] I didn’t wear the veil. I started 
wearing it exactly a year ago and this was because I felt comforted by seeing other 
girls. Before I had never seen anyone. Maybe I was embarrassed. It wasn’t that I 
was far away [from religion] but I didn’t find support. I felt like the only one in the 
middle of a lot of people that didn’t understand certain things (Maryam, 19).  
After a first phase of trying to find total integration with their native peers, many 
young women of foreign origins feel the need to relate to their own origins and to repo-
sition Islam in their lives, possibly seeking friendship that could help them on this 
path19. Especially as they grow up, Islam may become an essential element of identity 
for many young people, men and women, even if not they are not particularly practicing 
(Levitt 2009). In the biographies of the young women interviewed, the religious dimen-
sion takes on a new role as they grow up within a general reworking of their relation-
ship with their roots and their inherited identities. After the phase of childhood and early 
adolescence, often described in terms of seeking to assimilate to the majority models in 
society or acceptance of family heritage, individual paths of agency start to take shape. 
Many young people are seeking their own paths that differ both from those taken by 
their non-Muslim peers and those taken by earlier generations of Muslims. In this return 
to origins and to Islam, we see a perception emerge at points that these young women 
are more religious than their male peers, including brothers, cousins, and friends.  
 
Guys who like me come from Arab countries are less attached to the traditions […] 
Now a lot of guys with Muslim parents aren’t interested in it at all. It is almost eas-
ier to find a converted Italian guy that is interested in the religion. We girls are 
more religious, more attached to our origins (Leila, 16). 
                                                        
19 However, there are those who say, “I don’t like hanging out with the Egyptian, Arab community. I 
can’t relate. Maybe because I didn’t have a way of fitting in because I was always with my friends. There 
a lot of girls from the mosques who, if I see them, I say hi, but that’s all.  […]  I always wondered, if 
you’re in a country, Italy, why do you have to hide out only in your community of origin. They have this 
group, an Arab group, not all are Egyptians. Yeah, it’s nice sometimes to be in a place that reminds you 
of your origins, those of your parents. But I think only hanging out with Egyptian people, only going out 
with them, isn’t so great” (Fatima, 21). 
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This aspect should be investigated further with studies focused on the religiosity and 
multiple belongings of young male Muslims growing up in Italy from a comparative 
gender perspective in order to analyze the differences between the two sexes in relation 
to the processes of identities constructions. For now we can only note that within the 
Roman section both of G.M.I. and Islamic Relief young women predominate over 
young men, playing a central role in these associations. As consequence, currently, a 24 
year young woman of Moroccan origin, Nadia Bouzekri, is the president of G.M.I.. 
Moreover, it is worth to underline that, according to many interviewed turning individu-
ally and collectively to the sacred texts of Islam represents for women a useful tool to 
affirm gender equality in the name of Islam.  
Turning towards religion is not perceived as a return to the past, but as an expression 
of individual and collective redefinition deeply immersed in contemporary times. “Re-
turn to Islam” is a way of affirming oneself in the European public sphere not perceived 
as a kind of ghettoization or self exclusion (Khosrokhavar 2002). As a result, for some 
young people, Islam establishing itself in their lives translates into a desire to present 
signs of a new pietas islamica and manifesting forms of Muslim pride in response to 
growing Islamophobia in Western countries (Massari 2006). Just as young African-
Americans did in the 1970s with “black is beautiful”, young Muslims convert signs of 
stigma into something positive, stating that “Islam is beautiful” (Göle 1996). While a 
market for “Islamic” merchandise is emerging (like cell phone ring tones reminders 
about prayer times, and T-shirts with inscriptions praising the Prophet), young women 
cover their heads with veils that become, in the intentions of some, flags, banners, of the 
community that they feel is under attack and that they would like to represent with 
pride.  
 
I started wearing the veil this year, the first day of Ramadan. I wear it because I 
like it, because it represents me, it gives me strength. It is a crown. It is like repre-
senting the Islamic community, and an Islamic woman is not submissive but proud 
to wear it because it makes her strong and protected (Yara, 16). 
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According to many, wearing the veil is an expression of agency by Muslim women, 
rather than the passive acceptance of traditions or male rules. This marks an important 
difference with the generation of their mothers, who were often not veiled or, if they 
were, covered their heads more out of custom than out of the conscious choice. As not-
ed, it was through individual study, relating to peer groups, and choosing particular reli-
gious authorities, that young people are returning meaning to practices that had become 
mere custom in their eyes. 
 
I started wearing the veil the first year of middle school. I was in middle school, 
and I didn’t know how to understand a lot of things. I didn’t even know how to ex-
plain it to my classmates […] I would say that I wear it because I’m Muslim. It’s 
not that I knew how to find an explanation better than that, and then growing up, 
going to the mosque, I got to know a lot of girls, including some older than me, and 
I liked it. I also like to imitate how they dressed […] So I started to understand 
more the meaning of the veil, why you should cover yourself. Umm O. taught us 
and gradually I started to understand. If you understand the meaning, you care 
more about it. You also care about improving the way you dress. It wouldn’t make 
much sense to wear a veil with jeans and a T-shirt, and so I always tried to find the 
things that go with it. To get closer to God, you have to always have knowledge 
(Khadija, 24). 
 
The choice to wear the veil for most of the young women interviewed20 should be set 
within the general phenomenon of the return of the practice of covering the head in the 
Muslim world starting in the 1990s. Though, during the 20th century, the veil had been 
abandoned in many areas, for several decades we have been seeing a “return” of the veil 
in the public sphere (Ahmed 2011). For most of the young women who wear it today, 
the veil is considered first and foremost an act of pietas islamica, an expression of 
                                                        
20 Out of the sample of young women of Egyptian origin, nine out of 10 where the veil, and even the one 
who does not wear it says, “Women ‘should’ be veiled. So I will do it during my lifetime” (Fatima, 21). 
However we don’t want to  assume that this is the general trend for Muslim children of migrations. For 
example this data is in contrast to what emerged from a similar research on young women of moroccan 
and bengali origin in Italy, see Pepicelli 2015. If only some of the young women of moroccan origin were 
veiled, none of the young women of bengali origin were veiled. We should keep in mind that many Mus-
lim women choose not to wear the veil, for variety of reasons, ranging from the belief that covering the 
head is not required by the Koran to having a secular approach to the religious dimension. 
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submission to God, and removal from the gaze and desire of men. But the reasons 
behind its revival are not limited to the spiritual realm; its return to the public stage both 
in the “East” and “West” has a multiple meaning; in addition to religious, it is also 
identity-marking and political. The latter elements may join each other or be 
independent, and take on different connotations depending on the individual biographies 
(Pepicelli 2012). In the narratives in this study, the choice to wear the veil was 
presented by those concerned as an autonomous, independent decision, which 
nonetheless entailed quite a few problems in their everyday lives. Veiled women are in 
fact the primary target of growing Islamophobia in Italy, as in the rest of the Western 
world (Massari 2006, Enar 2016). The choice to cover one’s head renders veiled girls 
and women more vulnerable than boys and men who are not immediately identifiable as 
Muslims. 
All of the young women interviewed here tell of ongoing discrimination that they 
suffer because they wear the veil, and they agree in saying that they will come up 
against many more problems when it comes to finding a job due to the suspicion sur-
rounding veiled women. The predominant image in Europe is that those who cover their 
heads are both victims of men who force them to wear the veil, and are also accomplic-
es to their oppressors. Attachments to behaviors and dress codes that are “Islamic” are 
perceived as a sign of submission to fathers, brothers, and husbands, as well as a refusal 
to integrate and rejection of European liberal secular values. In the public debate in Ita-
ly, and in Europe more in general, on the subject of the veil we can see a constant oscil-
lation between presenting veiled women as oppressed, and simultaneously a bearer of a 
challenge to the established order, a threat to secularism (Scott 2007). And, significant-
ly, veiled women represent a form of irreducible otherness in the eyes of Italians. 
 
Even if you speak Italian, you were born here, you studied here, they see that 
you’re different if you have the veil. They even said to a converted girl with a veil 
that she was not Italian. Most people see you as a foreigner because of your reli-
gion. It’s bad because they consider you something that you’re not. No matter what 
you explain to them, people don’t care if you have citizenship or not. They see how 
you’re dressed, and they consider you foreign (Samia, 23) 
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Because of their veil, the young women feel exposed to a double form of discrimina-
tion – xenophobia because they are considered foreigners (even if they are born and 
raised in Italy), and islamophobia as they are Muslims. Those who wear the veil are 
immediately identifiable with Islam, and therefore categorized as “foreign”, “submis-
sive” and potentially “terrorists”, regardless of where they were born and raised, their 
political position or degree of self-determination.  
 
Though it is true that I’ve taken Italian citizenship, they still look at me as a for-
eigner, as a terrorist. Though it is true that the state has recognized me as Italian, at 
the end of the day, it is a piece of paper, people do not recognize me, so I feel like 
it doesn’t count. Bureaucratically, it made a lot of things easier for me, but I’m not 
seen as an Italian, so it’s a joke. […] Italians see me as Egyptian. Compared to my 
peers, they say to me, “You’re Egyptian” I was born here, and ultimately I am Ital-
ian, Italo-Egyptian I don’t need to integrate because I am Italian […] Every day is 
a challenge. Because you are not recognized as an Italian. You are seen only as 
Muslim. It is true that I am Muslim, and it is the first thing you see. But they ex-
pect, I don’t know, what from you, that you are submissive, that you are rude, that 
you are a terrorist. Everything that I’m not. This is hard. The looks of people on the 
subway. Sometimes I see an accusing look. Sometimes I want to say something, 
but I don’t know if it’s right or not. Or at university you find a professor that goes, 
“Oh, but you speak Italian so well!” Yeah, I am Italian! And then once I was talk-
ing on the phone on the subway with my dad. I speak Italian to my dad, and I see 
some guys looking at me. I was coming back from an exam and said to my dad “I 
got a good grade” And the girl goes, “Oh my God, she goes to University!” Yeah! 
They have a totally different idea of Islam. We young Muslims, who are part of an 
association, have built this country together alongside everyone else. We try to be 
active. We have contacts with the city government. We have meetings and projects 
with S. Egidio, the Red Cross, and then something like Charlie Hebdo happens and 
it destroys years of work. It’s really hard. Every time you think, “Okay, we made 
it, someone else comes along and destroys everything” Ultimately, Islam doesn’t 
belong to Arabs. It has no citizenship, just like Christianity, Judaism. This is what 
we want to make clear. It’s easy to find an Indian, Egyptian, or Moroccan Chris-
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tian. An Italian or German Jew. But they think it is inconceivable to have an Italian 
Muslim (Salwa, 23). 
 
You are born and grow up in a country that you feel is yours, and some people 
don’t see you as part of it, and they associate you with someone that they think is 
invading this country (Fatima, 21). 
 
The collected narratives very clearly show that the worsening of the international sit-
uation, due on one side to the threat of IS, and on the other from new waves of immigra-
tion (especially during summer and fall 2015), which the media and politicians present 
as a threat to European safety and stability, have worsened forms of discrimination 
against young Muslim women raised in Italy.  
 
We feel the racism more than you Italians do, because ultimately those of us who 
wear the veil experience it the most. My brother does not wear the veil. He dresses 
normally, and he has no problems. I’ll tell you about an episode of racism. I was 
walking to high school on the sidewalk. A car pulls up to me, rolls down the win-
dow and someone insults me and then spits at me. Episodes of racism happen so 
often now, I hardly even notice. I don’t respond. 
And now with ISIS, the Muslim Brothers, and terrorism the situation has gotten 
much worse. You walk down the street, and kids say, “Here comes ISIS” (Munira, 
21). 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
The narratives of young Muslim women of Egyptian origin analyzed here show the plu-
rality of identity belongings for the daughters of migration. The identity connection to 
Egypt, although a strong part of all the narratives, is not the only predominant element 
of their identities. A strong sense of belonging to Italy also recurs in all of the inter-
views. Children of migration simultaneously participate in more than one national con-
text: Italy and Egypt. Transnationalism characterizes their feelings and belongings. The 
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interviews outline a duality of national identifications, with a general problem finding 
single-sided definitions.  
Concerning religion there is the tendency to practice Islam disconnected from the lo-
cal traditions of Egypt as well as other Muslim majority countries. The children of mi-
grations describe the emergence of a European Islam with a transnational nature. They 
break with the religious paths of earlier generations in many respects, such as for exam-
ple the free choice of transnational religious authorities, the importance given to peers 
in socializing Islam or the multiple reasons for wearing the veil nowadays in the West.  
We also see what came out of this research in terms of the effects of the current po-
litical and economic situation in Italy and Europe on the lives of children of migrations. 
The economic crisis and the growth of xenophobia and Islamophobia due to interna-
tional, changes such as IS and growing immigration flows, strongly affect their lives, 
making them experience an increasing sense of discrimination.  
Finally, we would emphasize that the image given here, as it presents life fragments 
of a few young women of Egyptian origin, met in a specific phase of their lives, should 
not be taken as a still image, unchanging in time, but as a momentary glimpse. As said, 
positions and identities should not be considered fixed, but rather placed within dynam-
ic, constantly evolving relationships. 
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